From the start, critics of President Donald Trump’s memorandum of understanding with Iran—the one that led to the current broken ceasefire—noted that it gave Iran de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz.
Not only had Trump failed in all of his stated objectives—regime change, ending Iran’s nuclear program, and ending its support for terrorist groups—but he also promised Iran hundreds of billions of dollars in reparations and, effectively, perpetual control over one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.
“Upon the signing of this MOU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge, for 60 days only,” the memo reads, imposing a bizarre—and absolute—time limit on free passage. There is nothing ambiguous about “no charge, for 60 days only.”
Then it handed Iran and Oman responsibility for deciding what came next:
“The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialog with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.”
How could anyone read that and not conclude it was a green light for Iran and Oman to work out a toll system? Even the requirement that other regional states be part of the “discussion” means little. Iran could simply call them up and announce, “We’re charging $1 million per vessel.” That’s very much a discussion.
But once again, we now have evidence that there is no one serious negotiating on behalf of the United States.
“Trump administration officials saw that clause as unlocking the strait, the main accomplishment of the president’s deal,” reported the Wall Street Journal. “Iranian hard-liners, however, have used it to push a maximalist interpretation that gives the Islamic Republic exclusive control over the waterway as a key source of leverage. The U.S. and its Arab Gulf allies don’t want Iranian hegemony over Hormuz, the lifeline for much of the world’s oil and gas supply. The language of the deal has left the two sides fighting over that point rather than making progress on a final agreement on Tehran’s nuclear program.”
If the U.S. didn’t want Iranian hegemony, why did they negotiate a deal that offered free passage for only two months, then gave carte blanche to lock in their hegemony?
“This gap in interpretation is wide, baked into the deal, and not exactly surprising,” Israeli geopolitical analyst Michael Horowitz told the Journal. “Washington has tried to convince Tehran that compliance would be more profitable, but this framing misses the point. Iran’s behavior isn’t driven by financial motives but by security concerns and bargaining leverage. It’s a power dynamic.”
That’s the fundamental flaw in Trump’s negotiating style. He assumes everyone is motivated by the same transactional incentives that drive him. He has built his public persona around the idea that every negotiation has a winner and a loser, boasting that he always comes out on top. As George Wu of the University of Chicago Booth School put it, Trump “casts negotiation as a zero-sum game, with a clear winner and a clear loser.”
Ironically, it was Iran—not Trump—that actually negotiated this agreement according to that philosophy, maximizing its leverage, exploiting every ambiguity, and walking away with the better deal.
“Iran saw the deal as a recognition it was in control. Now countries in the region are paying the price,” Emirati political strategist Amjad Taha told the Journal. “It’s a disaster, and we are back to square one.”
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